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In "Interpretations of Life and disti nction between zoe and bios, 
Prohibitions against Killing," Thoma- being alive and having a life. Her aim 
sine Kushner develops the valuable is to provide the basis for a more 
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rational application of moral rules 
against killing. "Having a life," says 
Kushner, "means being the subject of 
a certain life with its accompanying 
history, nexus of personal and social 
relationships, complex patterns of 
psychological characteristics, plus the 
whole fabric of events as they happen 
to and affect the individual." Beings 
who have lives are also "capable of 
some degree of problem solving, 
effecting relationships that give satis-
faction, benefiting from past experi-
ences to influence present situations, 
as well as experiencing and express-
ing a range of emotions."l 
Kushner suggests that bios, 
understood in this sense, is the most 
rational basis for prohibitions against 
killing. She thus opts for a position 
intermediate . between that of many 
Eastern religions, which often include 
all animals (and in the case of Jai-
nism, all living beings) within their 
sphere of moral concern, and the 
dominant tradition in the West, which 
includes only humans. Kushner does 
a n excellent job of s howi ng that 
acceptance of this criterion would 
require extension of the right to life 
to many non-human animals. There 
are, of course, gradations of bios: 
some animals have more complex 
"biograph.ies" than others, and there-
fore, in the case of conflict, would be 
entitled to preferential treatment, so 
far as preserving their lives is con-
cerned. Kushner's position is thus 
consistent with maintaining that human 
life in general is of greater value than 
animal life, but she shows herself 
quite free of speciesist prejudice by 
pointing out that a conflict could the-
oretically arise in which one would be 
morally obliged to save the life of a 
non-human rather than a human, if 
the non-human's life exhibited the 
qualities of bios to a greater degree. 
The concept of bios is a worthwhile 
contribution to value theory and to 
the ethical foundation of our duties to 
(many) non-human animals. In the 
present paper, however, Kushner uti-
lizesit to argue a thesis which is not 
convincing. She begins by noting 
that the sacredness of life is a princi-
ple shared by Eastern and Western 
culture. They differ only as to "how 
the term life is to be interpreted." 
That term, according to Kushner, is 
ambiguous, and its ambiguity is the 
sou rce of differing prohibitions 
against killing. For the Jains, the 
extension of 'life' is all living beings, 
while for the Western world it is 
solely human beings. Kushner sug-
gests that a more appropriate exten-
sion would be "all beings which have 
lives. 11 
She thus presents the moral prob-
lem of the sacredness of life as 
though it were at bottom merely a lin-
guistic or conceptual difficulty. 2 In 
her account the diversity of prohib-
itions against killing is "traceable to 
an ambiguity in the term life, 11 and a 
more rational basis for such prohib-
itions can accordi ngly be reached sim-
ply th rough analysis and reinterpre-11 
tation 11 of that term. 
But surely this is to get things 
backwards. The ambiguity of the 
term 'life', as used by different cul-
tures, derives from their radically 
differing val ue systems, not the other 
way around. To clarify the term 'life' 
is merely to point out these differ-
ences, not to resolve them. In point 
of fact, Kushner is not primarily 
engaged in linguistic or conceptual 
analysis at all, but in value theory. 
Her argument is synthetic, for it 
involves the recommendation of an 
alternative val ue system as a basis for 
prohibitions against killing. But in 
order to establish her claim that bIos 
is a preferable criterion for preserva-
tion of life, it would be necessary to 
explicate the true foundations of what 
she ta kes to be erroneous concepts of 
life, to show that these are, in fact, 
false, and to prove the the concept of 
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bios is preferable. To what extent is 
she successful in doing this? 
Kushner's explication of the Jainist 
and Buddhist views on killing is quite 
lucid so far as it goes but fails to 
make clear what the true basis for 
these positions is. The greater inclu-
siveness of Eastern prohibitions 
against killing is typically rooted in 
fundamental metaphysical conceptions 
of a unified totality of being quite 
alien to the dualistic, creationist 
metaphysic of the Christian West. 
The belief in reincarnation also often 
plays a decisive role in this regard, 
particularly in Hi ndu ism. Kush ner's 
ready dismissal of Eastern prohibitions 
against killing of all animal life as 
morally "counter-intuitive" is rather 
parochial. It may be counter-intuitive 
to us Westerners, but it would by no 
means be so to a Hindu, a Buddhist, 
or a Jain. For a devotee of the 
Krishna consciousness movement, for 
example, the universal ban on killing. 
of animal· life is rooted in the belief 
that all animals possess self-identical 
souls. "Having a life," in Kushner's 
sense, is from this viewpoint by no 
means a. prerequisite for having a 
soul, and ergo not a prerequisite for 
respecting an animal's life. 
Moreover, even if we grant, from a 
Western perspective, the greater value 
of bios over zoe, it is not clear why 
zoe should thereby be completely 
excluded from moral consideration. It 
wou Id seem equally consistent with 
Kushner's general position to maintain 
that all animals (or even all living 
beings) have an intrinsic right to life, 
although those whose lives have the 
quality of bios have a greater right to 
life. 
There IS some reason to believe 
that such a position is more nearly 
correct than the one which Kushner 
adopts. When we exclude, for exam-
ple, all indirect grounds for moral 
objection to the gratuitous killing of 
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non-animal, living beings (e.g., the 
effect on humans, other animals, or 
the eco-system, aesthetic concerns, 
etc.), there remains in sensitive per-
sons a residue of outrage which can 
only be accounted for in terms of the 
"interests" of those beings them-
selves. That the natu re of existence 
compels us to kill some living beings 
in order to survive does not prove 
that we are not morally obliged to 
avoid killing whenever possible. 
Two of the prominent objections in 
the Western tradition to the granting 
of rights to animals are that for a 
being to have rights it must be capa-
ble of asserting those rights, and that 
for a being to be the beneficiary of 
an obligation, it must be capable of 
fulfilling similar obligations in return. 
If it is not capable of this, then we 
can have no duties toward it and, a 
fortiori, it can have no rights. 
Kushner attacks these positions using 
the so-called "argument from marginal 
cases." The case of human infants 
and the mentally retarded would seem 
to suggest that the capabi.lity of 
asserting rights or fulfilling moral 
obligations is not a prerequisite for 
the possession of rights, assuming 
that we are willing to accord rights to 
these humans. 
The same argument could be 
applied, of course, to the various 
other criteria wh ich a re often pre-
sented for denying non-human animals 
rights in general, or the right to life 
in particular. Implicit in the attribu-
tion of rights to infants and mentally 
retarded humans is the recognition 
that the criteria ordinarily employed 
for denying animals the right to life 
are too high. 
Kushner fails in her paper, how-
ever, to prove that bios is the correct 
criterion. Since in many cases infants 
and mentally retarded persons fail to 
exhibit the qualities of bios, the 
argument from marginal cases would 
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seem to suggest the appropriateness entails a right to life. In spite of its 
of a lower criterion than bios as the valuable contribution to the elucidation 
basis for the right to life. Nor is of the problem and the broadening of 
Kushner's explanation as to why bios our moral horizons, Kushner's article 
is valuable very compelli ng. More thus fails to provide a final answer to 
importantly, she ma kes no attempt to the question, "What life is sacred?" 
show how such value, if it exists, 
George P. Cave 
Trans-Species Unlimited 
NOTES 
Kushner, p. 151. 
2. Kushner never makes it clear in her article whether she thinks she is 
doing conceptual or linguistic analysis. 
